Survey of Literature on Covered and Uncovered Interest Parities by Pasricha, Gurnain Kaur
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Survey of Literature on Covered and
Uncovered Interest Parities
Gurnain Kaur Pasricha
University of California, Santa Cruz
December 2006
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/22737/
MPRA Paper No. 22737, posted 18. May 2010 12:13 UTC
 - 1 - 
 
 
 
Survey of Literature on Covered and Uncovered Interest Parities1 
- Gurnain Kaur Pasricha2 
 
Department of Economics, UCSC 
December 2006 
 
Abstract 
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I. Basic Concepts 
 
In a fully integrated world with perfectly competitive profit maximizing agents 
and no transactions costs, the following Covered Interest Parity (CIP) condition would 
hold in equilibrium: 
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Where it and it* are respectively returns on comparable domestic and foreign 
assets between time t and t+1, St is the domestic currency price of foreign currency, Ft is 
the forward rate or the next period domestic currency price of foreign exchange delivered 
next period. Since all the variables in the above equation are known a priori, any 
deviation from this parity in our model world represents pure profits and therefore cannot 
exist in equilibrium. In addition, assuming risk neutral rational agents implies that 
forward rate would equal the expected future rate therefore, the Uncovered Interest Parity 
(UIP) condition must also hold in equilibrium: 
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However, in a world with oligopolistic players in financial markets, 
underdeveloped money markets, exchange or capital controls or risk of such controls, 
differential taxation, limited supply of capital, sovereign immunities, transaction costs 
and other inconveniences, forward rate may differ from current spot rate by more than the 
interest differential and moreover, it may differ from expected future spot rate [Keynes, 
1923; Dooley and Isard, 1980; Frankel 1992; Frenkel and Levich (1975)].  The former 
difference has been estimated by several studies (reviewed below) for industrial countries 
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to lie within the bounds implied by the existing transactions costs, thus validating the 
covered interest parity relationship. How much the latter differential can be in an efficient 
market has been the subject of several asset pricing models (e.g. Lucas, 1982; Frenkel 
and Razin, 1980; Svensson, 1985 and Stulz, 1984), portfolio balance models (Branson 
and Henderson, 1985; Frankel, 1983, 1984) and currency crises models (Arias, 2001).  
The presence of an expected variable, unobserved to the econometrician, makes it 
hard to test for UIP directly. It has therefore been tested empirically by assuming rational 
expectations and/or CIP. Taking logs of (2) and imposing rational expectations, we get:  
*
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where the small case letters denote logs. The above relation can be expressed as 
the null 1,0:0 == βαH  in the equation: 
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*
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If one additionally assumes that CIP holds, then a test of 1,0:1 == ρδH  in the 
following equation is equivalent to the test in (3)3: 
ttttt sfss ξρδ +−+=−+ )(1     (4) 
Both the above specifications have been used to test the validity of UIP 
assumption, although it must be remembered that neither is a direct test, and (4) involves, 
in addition to the RE assumption, the assumption of no risk premium in forward rate. 
1,0:1 == ρδH  is therefore referred to as the Risk Neutral Efficient Market 
Hypothesis [RNEMH]. A weaker version is the unbiasedness hypothesis, which allows a 
risk premium in (4) but constrains it to be uncorrelated with information set at time t., 
                                                 
3 Taking logs of (1) yields 
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thus putting it in the error term. Basically, RNEMH requires that no other variable have 
any explanatory power in (4).  
Note that (4) can be transformed into: 
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This is equivalent to (4) under the assumptions a1=b1=0, i.e. under H1. This 
specification tests for existence of predictable excess returns in the forward market. 
Note also that the interest differential may be expressed as: 
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where the first term on the right is the covered interest differential, the second 
term is the excess of forward rate over expected future rate and the last term is the 
expected depreciation. Covered interest differential may exist because of transactions 
costs, existence of capital controls and risks of future capital controls, thinness of markets 
and other reasons discussed above. The second term may be non-zero if the agents are 
risk-averse. Taking the last term to the left hand side gives us the uncovered interest 
differential, which by definition then, is the sum of the covered interest differential and 
what is known as the currency or exchange risk premium, i.e.  
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When the covered interest parity doesn’t hold, then the uncovered parity will not 
hold, unless the exchange risk premium for some reason is negative and exactly equal to 
the covered differential, a highly unlikely scenario. This observation is particularly 
relevant when testing for the parities in emerging markets. 
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Specifications (3)-(5) are valid regression equations only if the variables on both sides of 
the equations are stationary. Tests of unbiasedness or of CIP above therefore are based on 
the assumption that the exchange rate and the forward rate are co-integrated with co-
integration vector (1, -1). Actual tests of stationarity of exchange rates and forward rates 
have often found them to be I(1) processes, which makes the LHS of (3) stationary. 
Unbiasedness therefore requires that the forward premium be stationary as well. 
Although there are good economic reasons to believe that that should be so – when the 
CIP holds, the forward premium is simply the interest differentials - results of studies of 
forward premium stationarity are mixed [Hutchison and Singh, 1997; Horvath and 
Watson, 1994; Evans and Lewis, 1994; Engel, 1996 for a survey]. While unbiasedness 
can hold only if the exchange rate and forward rate are co-integrated, the reverse is not 
true. Finding co-integration between st+1 and ft does not imply that unbiasedness holds. 
The additional requirement that unbiasedness imposes is that this co-integrating vector as 
well as the co-integrating vector between st and ft be (1,-1).  
Another thing to take into account while estimating an equation such as (4) is the 
conditional heteroskedasticity of errors, which will be present in one-period horizon data 
if forex markets are characterized by tranquil and turbulent periods. Errors will also be 
conditionally heteroskedastic if the data is sampled at a higher frequency than the 
forward rate horizon (e.g. using daily data on one-month forward interest rates). This is 
typically taken care of by using the GMM estimator proposed by Hansen (1982). 
Bulk of the empirical research on interest parities has focused on industrialized 
countries. I review some of this literature below. 
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II. Literature Review 
II.1 Covered Interest Parity 
 
“…Forward quotations for the purchase of the currency of the dearer 
money market tend to be cheaper than spot quotations by a percent per month equal 
to the excess of the interest which can be earned in a month in the dearer market 
over what can be earned in the cheaper.” [Keynes, 1923,  p103] 
Empirical literature on CIP has generally tended to validate the hypothesis for the 
industrial countries, within the limits of the transaction costs and limits to speed of 
adjustment due to imperfectly elastic supply of funds. Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) 
compute covered interest differentials with monthly data vis-à-vis the Pound Sterling for 
US and German markets for the period 1921-2003.  They estimated: 
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and found that the differentials were large between 1920 and 1980, but shrank 
considerably after 1980 [See Figure 2]. For the period 1870-1914, they use data on 
interest rates on long bills of exchange and find shrinking differences between 1870-1914 
as well (another reason to expect shrinking differences now, in Emerging Economies). 
Significantly, these differences became lower post 1980 than they were at the peak of the 
Gold Standard. And have been falling since…Frankel (1991) estimated a time trend in 
absolute value of covered interest differentials for 25 developed countries during the 
1980’s and found a statistically significant negative trend for 10 of those 25 countries.  
Other studies that have estimated the differential in (6) and tested for presence of 
profitable opportunities outside of the “transfer points” include Frenkel and Levich 
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(1975), Clinton (1988), Taylor (1989), Peel and Taylor (2002) and Obstfeld and Taylor 
(2004). Transfer points measure the minimum interest differentials that would induce 
arbitrage (because of the existence of transaction costs, controls etc). These transfer 
points have been estimated through data on triangular arbitrage, bid-ask spreads and 
brokerage fees and endogenously through a Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model in 
Peel and Taylor (2002) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004). 
 Clinton (1988) estimated, for 5 major currencies against the US$, a transfer band 
of ±6 basis points in the mid-1980’s. He rejected the null of zero deviations from parity, 
but found that any such deviations were small and short lived. Frenkel and Levich (1975) 
estimate transaction costs in foreign exchange markets through triangular arbitrage 
differentials and in securities markets through bid-ask spreads and find that these explain 
85 per cent of the deviations from CIP. The rest could be explained to a large extent by 
less than perfectly elastic demand and supply curves and by lags between observing a 
profitable opportunity and arbitraging. Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) and Peel and Taylor 
(2002) use a TAR methodology to estimate transfer bands of ± 19 basis points for New 
York London and ± 35 basis points for London-Berlin transactions for the period 1880-
1914, and bands of about ± 50 basis points for the 1920’s. Deviations outside the bands 
do occur in their samples, but these tend to be mean reverting. These suggest a much 
higher degree of integration in the post-Bretton Woods era than what was attained in the 
pre-1914 period of financial globalization. Moreover, Dooley and Isard (1980) showed 
that much of the differentials could be accounted for by political risks, including capital 
controls and risks of their imposition.  
CIP has also been tested as 1,0:'0 == baH  in: 
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Examples of such studies include Grubel (1966), Branson (1969), Cosandier and 
Lang (1981), Fratianni and Wakeman (1982). Furthur confirmation of CIP has been 
obtained from survey data. Herring and Marston, 1976 and Levich, 1985 present 
evidence from interviews of large bankers that reveal that they use spreads between 
forward and spot rates to determine the spreads between domestic and foreign currency 
deposit rates they offer. Also that CIP condition was used to determine forward exchange 
rates that traders offered to clients. Popper (1993) and Vierira (2003) provide evidence 
that CIP more or less holds even at longer maturities (more than one year). Deviations 
were found to be linked to out-of-line fiscal policies. Taylor and Branson (2004) is a 
study of covered interest parity between US and Russia, which finds large bands around 
the equality using the TAR technique, but these bands are not symmetric. The lower 
bound is close to zero and the upper bound, which involves borrowing in US dollars and 
lending in Rubles to be large, about 1 per cent.  
 
II.2 Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) 
 
Uncovered Interest Parity has become notorious as a favorite theoretical 
abstraction which is resoundingly rejected by data. Part of the reason is that it cannot be 
tested directly, and therefore has to be tested in conjunction with rational expectations, as 
the unbiasedness hypothesis. Froot and Thaler (1990) in a famous survey, reported an 
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average estimated value of β for industrialized countries in equation (4)4 to be -0.88 for 
data of maturity more than one day and less than one year. Surveys by Macdonald and 
Taylor (1992) and Isard (1996) came to similar conclusions. Tests of the alternative 
specification in (5) yield similar results. Backus, Gregory and Telman (1993) estimated 
equation (5) and find estimated b1 close to 2, consistent with an estimated β close to -1 in 
(4). A b1 different from zero implies excess returns that are predictable, and therefore 
exploitable. Similar results can be found in Fama (1984) and Bilson (1981). Chinn and 
Meredith (2004) use data from 1980-2000 at 3, 6 and 12 month horizons for 6 major 
currencies and find an average coefficient also of -0.8, with four of the estimated 
coefficients having the wrong sign and being significantly different from unity. Another 
important finding is that estimates from the arbitrage equations tend to be highly 
imprecise, so even where one cannot reject the null of unity coefficient one can often also 
not reject the null of zero coefficient.   
Several explanations have been forwarded for this failure of unbiasedness to hold 
at horizons less than a year and more than a few hours. These basically fall into three 
categories: Risk Premium, Forecast Errors, and Non-Linearities.  
Risk Premium models include static Capital Asset Pricing Models (and the 
portfolio balance models) [Branson and Henderson, 1985; Frankel 1983, 1984] and 
dynamic general equilibrium models [Lewis, 1995; Lucas, 1982]. Fama (1984) showed 
that any explanation relying on risk-premium to explain the negative estimated betas (or 
any beta less than half) must satisfy two criteria: One, there must be a negative 
correlation between the risk premium and expected depreciation. Two, risk premium 
                                                 
4 No distinction is made here between estimates of (3) and (4). For industrialized countries, the series for 
interest differentials and forward premia are so highly correlated that estimates from the two specifications 
are similar.  
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must be more volatile than expected depreciation. Both types of risk premium models fail 
on the second count. In a static CAPM, Lewis (1995) showed that the risk premium’s 
variability must come from one or more of the following three: (a) shares of home and 
foreign wealth held in different assets (b) shares of world wealth held by home and 
foreign countries or (c) conditional variance of exchange rate and co-variances between 
exchange rate and domestic and foreign inflations. None of the three are sufficiently 
variable in the data to account for the high variability in risk premium. Other portfolio 
balance models, for example those discussed in Giovannini and Jorion (1989), Flood and 
Rose (1996) and McCallum (1994) postulate the risk premium as a function of volatility 
of exchange rate; and of considerations of liquidity, size and depth of financial markets5 
[Davanne, 1990]. Lucas (1982) model can in theory explain the higher variability of risk 
premium than of exchange rate change, but the degree of risk aversion required to obtain 
this result is very large [Bekaert and Hodrick, 1992]. Other versions of CAPM do not fare 
much better. Allowing for habit persistence as in Backus, Gregory and Telmar (1993) or 
allowing for first order risk aversion as in Bekaert, Hodrick and Marshall (1997) 
increases variability of risk premium, but not by enough. Moreover, Froot and Frankel 
(1989) used survey data to decompose excess return and found that the component due to 
risk premium was not large. A bigger challenge that risk premium explanations face is to 
explain the dependence of betas on sample period used, for example, the pattern shown in 
Figure 4 below.   
Two sources of forecast errors have been identified in the literature: irrational 
expectations and rational systematic errors. Irrational expectations may arise because of 
presence of heterogeneous traders in the market [Carlson and Osler, 1999; Mark and Wu, 
                                                 
5 This explanation is used to justify the negative risk premia on US$. 
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1998; Froot and Frankel, 1989; Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990]. In 
these models, the risk premium and departures from UIP depend on the relative size of 
rational speculators vs. other agents in the market. This is the only explanation forwarded 
that allows for market inefficiency. The others try to explain how negative coefficients 
may arise despite the markets being efficient. The second set of explanations relying on 
forecast errors highlight the difficulties in measuring accurately rational expectations 
with sample data. Rational systematic forecast errors in sample data may arise because 
of: (a) Presence of regime shifts and Bayesian updation of probabilities that regime shift 
has actually occurred. (b) Peso problems, i.e. the misalignment of sample moment from 
population moments because not all events to which agents accord positive probabilities 
have actually occurred in the sample. Lewis (1989) showed that not all the excess returns 
could be explained by learning models and Lewis (1995) that the same applies to peso 
problems. 
A third and in my view the most satisfactory way of explaining the unwholesome 
estimates of beta in the unbiasedness equations are non-linearities. These may arise 
because of transaction costs [Baldwin, 1990; Dumas, 1992], Central Bank intervention 
[MacCallum 1993; Mark and Moh, 2002 and Moh 2002] or because of limits to 
speculation [Keynes, 1923; Lyons, 2001 pp 206-220]. Empirical work on non-linearities 
includes Leon, Sarno and Valente, 2004; Baillie and Kilic, 2004; Flood and Rose, 1996; 
Flood and Taylor, 1996 and Bansal and Dahlquist, 2000. We know that the real world is 
not frictionless and that there exist transactions costs, which have reduced dramatically in 
the last 10 or 15 years, but still exist. We therefore need to take these into account as 
constraints over market induced arbitrage. Baldwin (1990) shows that even small 
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transactions costs can induce relatively large hysteresis bands, i.e. a range of deviations 
within which speculative activities will not occur, so that the usual linear equation tests 
are misleading. Tests of CIP seem to have incorporated these transactions costs more 
readily than tests of unbiasedness. Baldwin (1990) also shows that with transaction costs, 
hysteresis bands would be wider for daily trading horizons than with annual trading, so 
that long-horizon parity would hold better in linear tests than short-horizon, a result seen 
in the literature, as discussed below. Nonlinearity based literature also explains better the 
changes in betas over time and across countries [Baillie and Bollerslev, 2000 and Figure 
4 below] 
 
Unbiasedness at very short and at long horizons 
 
Lyons and Rose (1995) and Chaboud and Wright (2005) find support for 
Unbiasedness with very high frequency data. Both the studies exploit the fact that interest 
is only paid on positions open overnight. Chaboud and Wright (2005) regress exchange 
rate change between end of day t and beginning of day t+1 [1630 NYT and 2100 NYT] 
on overnight interest differential and find that for all but yen-dollar trade, estimated 
coefficients are positive and insignificantly different from 1. Lyons and Rose (1995) use 
data on intra-day positions for currencies under attack (so that a depreciation is expected 
and interest differentials are large) and argue that such positions don’t earn interest and so 
need to be rewarded by appreciation, conditional on the expectations of depreciation not 
having been realized. Moreover, they show that the larger the expected depreciation, and 
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therefore the interest differential, the more the currency appreciates within any day 
during which it does not depreciate.  
Meredith and Chinn (1998) and Chinn (2006) obtained panel estimates for UIP at 5 
and 10 year horizons for 4 countries and obtained betas close to 1, although these were 
imprecisely estimated. Lothian and Simaan (1998) used time averaged long-horizon data 
to obtain evidence in favor of UIP for 1974-1994. Cheung et. al (2005) also note more 
evidence of UIP at long, rather than at short horizons. Figure 3 below summarizes panel 
data evidence on unbiasedness for horizons varying from 3 months to 10 years. 
Several explanations have been forwarded for long-short result discrepancy. These 
include: 
• Weak exogeneity of long run rates in a model where monetary authorities use short 
term rates as instruments.[MacCallum 1993, Anker 1999, Chinn and Meredith 
2004, Moore 1994]  
• Segmented Short and Long Term bond markets, because of ‘preferred habitat’ [Lim 
and Ogaki 2003; Alexius and Sellin, 2001] or ‘limited participation’ [Mizrach and 
Occhino, 2004; Lahiri et.al., 2003; Alvarez et. al., 2001] 
• Different expectations at different horizons [Frenkel and Froot 1987, Froot and Ito 
1989] 
• For very high frequency data, the risk involved in taking an open position goes to 
zero. If one believes that the estimates of unbiasedness at other horizons are 
corrupted by the existence of a time-varying risk premium, then the very high 
frequency data, by eliminating that risk premium, should yield a coefficient of 1 if 
UIP in fact holds.  
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• Transactions costs induced hysteresis bands which are larger for shorter horizon 
data [Baldwin, 1990] 
 
Tests of UIP with survey data 
 
Direct tests of UIP have been attempted from survey data on expectations, and the 
results favor UIP, thus implying that rejection of unbiasedness in the data comes from 
imposition of rational and linear expectations. [Froot and Frankel 1989, Chinn and 
Frankel 1994, 2002; Chinn 2006]. The problems with survey data are that these might not 
reflect true expectations, might have different working horizons than those of the 
forecasters and more importantly might be based on the current forward premium 
themselves. Another issue with survey data is its availability and completeness.  
 
Unbiasedness over time 
 
Flood and Rose (2002) and Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) provide evidence that 
deviations from UIP were lower in the 1990’s than earlier. Flood and Rose (2002) use 
daily data from both industrial and some emerging market economies and find that not 
only are estimated coefficients positive in the 1990’s (compared to negative coefficients 
found in studies with data for previous decades) but also that UIP holds better at times of 
crises. Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) estimate betas from 5 year rolling regressions, 
beginning March 1973 with monthly horizon data and find that in the 1990’s even 
conventional estimates of betas turned positive [See Figure 4]. Chinn and Meredith 
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(2005) however find that the same cannot be said when data of 3 month horizon is used. 
Even if one accepts that higher estimated betas imply that UIP held better in the 1990’s 
one if still left with explaining why the same should be the case for the 1970’s. Given the 
evidence reviewed above, the case for estimates from linear equations being biased 
because of non-linearities introduced by frictions is strong, and an adequate answer to the 
question of whether or not deviations from UIP have reduced over time needs to take 
these into account while testing for UIP in samples with different time periods. I am not 
aware of any such study, even for the industrialized countries. 
 
Unbiasedness in Emerging markets 
 
Chinn and Frankel (1994) was an early study on UIP in emerging markets and 
used survey data to test the condition for East Asian economies.  
Flood and Rose (2002) use daily data on interest differentials for 10 emerging markets for 
the 1990’s and find that for four out of the ten, the coefficients are non-negative. Their 
study however, focuses exclusively on the 1990’s and on a few emerging markets that 
suffered a crises in that period, and the question they are trying to answer is whether 
during crises the UIP holds better than otherwise. Both Flood and Rose (2002) and 
Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) find that unbiasedness holds better in times of high inflation 
and inflation volatility, perhaps because the exchange rate depreciations are more easily 
forecast in such periods. The latter also find that it holds better for lower income 
countries6, a finding not corroborated in Flood and Rose (2002). Frankel and Poonawala 
                                                 
6 Why this should be so, is a question left largely unanswered.  
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(2004) examine the unbiasedness hypothesis using data on forward rates for the period 
1996-2004, for 14 emerging markets and find eight positive coefficients, although these 
are imprecisely estimated. However, the specification in equation (4) is a test of 
unbiasedness only on the assumption that covered interest parity holds. This assumption 
is very likely to be violated for emerging markets, for reasons discussed in Section II. 
Francis, Hasan and Hunter (2002) investigate the impact that emerging market 
liberalization has on the time-varying risk premium demanded by US investors. They try 
to link each liberalization episode with subsequent movements in excess returns in 
currency deposits and find that much of the excess returns are due to and compensation 
for bearing systematic (non-diversifiable) risk, a claim disputed in Bansal and Dahlquist 
(2000). . Their data is averaged monthly deposit rates from the IFS. Since much of the 
arbitrage in emerging markets is undertaken by financial institutions, not individual 
investors, one needs to look not at deposit rates (which, as given in IFS are the average 
monthly rates on deposits offered to resident customers) but at rates at which financial 
institutions (including non-resident financial institutions) can lend and borrow between 
dates A and B and the depreciation between those two dates.  
When discussing unbiasedness in emerging markets, consideration has to be taken 
of the fact that most of these have had fixed exchange rates over at least part of the last 
20 year period. If the fixed rate is perfectly credible, the expected exchange rate would 
equal the actual rate and the home and foreign rates would be equal. Arias(2001) 
summarizes how the UIP relationship is modified in models where the fixed rate is less 
than credible, hence susceptible to an attack (most of these modifications are in the spirit 
of the portfolio balance models discussed above). The interest rate in this case would 
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exceed the foreign rate by a devaluation risk premium, but different currency crises 
models differ on how this premium is modeled. This literature also generates interesting 
insights on what the UIP differential should depend on. In the case where there is a 
positive probability, say ρ of the devaluation and where the rate of devaluation, if it 
occurs is known at δ. Then, the UIP relation will be: 
tsii *
* ρδ+=  
The first generation crises models of Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber 
(1984) the fundamentals, i.e. the ability of the central bank to defend the exchange rate 
are continuously deteriorating because of a fiscal policy inconsistent with a monetary 
one. The interest rate in these models is fixed until the date of depreciation when it 
jumps. If you add uncertainty in the level of reserves that the central bank will commit to 
the exchange rate defense and limit the mobility of capital, then one gets more interesting 
parity conditions like the one suggested by Artus (1994): 
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Where dt is the external debt of the domestic country, λ is a constant inversely 
proportional to the degree of capital mobility, pt is the price level, z is the external 
balance. Other modifications of the UIP7 include adding a self-fulfilling mechanism by 
specifying the UIP as follows [Flood and Marion, 1998]: 
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7 Discussed in Arias (2001) 
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Where x is proportional to the degree of risk aversion, θ, bt, and b*t are the shares 
of world wealth in domestic assets and foreign assets respectively and var(st+1) is the 
conditional variance of the future exchange rate. Or as in a bond-market led speculative 
attack model as: 
)( *1
*
tttt
e sbbsii −−+∆+= + θ  
Another interesting modification specific to emerging markets is suggested by 
Arida, Bacha and Lara-Resende (2004) wherein the risk premium depends on the 
interaction between judicial uncertainty (the uncertainty that contracts will be enforced 
by courts) and capital controls.  
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Table 1: De-Facto Openness: Accumulated Stock of Foreign Assets and 
Liabilities 
(Ratio to GDP) 
 Emerging Market Economies Industrialized Economies 
Year 
Foreign 
Assets 
Foreign 
Liabilities Total 
Foreign 
Assets 
Foreign 
Liabilities Total 
1980 7.4 20.9 28.3 33.1 32.1 65.2 
1982 9.0 28.4 37.4 38.2 37.9 76.1 
1985 12.9 32.8 45.7 46.6 46.4 93.0 
1990 15.7 28.1 43.7 61.4 62.9 124.3 
1995 26.7 46.1 72.8 70.9 71.8 142.8 
2000 40.8 60.0 100.8 121.2 125.1 246.4 
2004 53.7 66.1 119.8 158.5 164.8 323.4 
Source: Constructed using data from Lane-Milesi-Feretti (2006).   
Notes: Emerging Market Economies include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, 
China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan province of China, Thailand, Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Israel, South Africa, Turkey 
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Figure 1: Average External Assets and Liabilities, Emerging Markets 
 
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferreti, 2004. Emerging Market Economies include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan province of 
China, Thailand, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Israel, South Africa, Turkey. 
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Figure 2: Covered Interest Differentials US-UK and UK-Germany 
1870-2003 
 
Note: Annual samples of monthly data 
Source: Obstfeld and Taylor (2004) 
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Figure 3: Panel beta coefficients for Euro-deposit rates at different horizons 
for 6 major currencies against US$. 
 
Source: Chinn (2006) 
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Figure 4: Unbiasedness Over Time 
 
Notes: Rolling 5-year DM–$ unbiasedness regressions. The figure graphs the 208 slope coefficients 
obtained from the unbiasedness regression based on rolling monthly 5-year sub-samples for the DM–$ 
exchange rate beginning with the sample from March 1973 until February 1978, ending with the 5-year 
sample from December 1990 through to November 1995. The dashed lines give the conventional two OLS 
standard error confidence bands. 
Source: Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) 
 
